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Abstract. Extensions provide useful additional functionality for web browsers,
but are also an increasingly popular vector for attacks. Due to the high degree
of privilege extensions can hold, extensions have been abused to inject advertise-
ments into web pages that divert revenue from content publishers and potentially
expose users to malware. Users are often unaware of such practices, believing
the modifications to the page originate from publishers. Additionally, automated
identification of unwanted third-party modifications is fundamentally difficult, as
users are the ultimate arbiters of whether content is undesired in the absence of
outright malice.
To resolve this dilemma, we present a fine-grained approach to tracking the prove-
nance of web content at the level of individual DOM elements. In conjunction
with visual indicators, provenance information can be used to reliably determine
the source of content modifications, distinguishing publisher content from con-
tent that originates from third parties such as extensions. We describe a prototype
implementation of the approach called ORIGINTRACER for Chromium, and eval-
uate its effectiveness, usability, and performance overhead through a user study
and automated experiments. The results demonstrate a statistically significant im-
provement in the ability of users to identify unwanted third-party content such as
injected ads with modest performance overhead.
Keywords: Web security, Ad injection, Browser extension
1 Introduction
Browser extensions enhance browsers with additional useful capabilities that are not
necessarily maintained or supported by the browser vendor. Instead, this code is typ-
ically written by third parties and can perform a wide range of tasks, from simple
changes in the appearance of web pages to sophisticated tasks such as fine-grained
filtering of content. To achieve these capabilities, browser extensions possess more priv-
ilege than other third-party code that runs in the browser. For instance, extensions can
access cross-domain content, and perform network requests that are not subject to the
same origin policy. Because these extensive capabilities allow a comparatively greater
degree of control over the browser, they provide a unique opportunity to attack users
and their data, the underlying system, and even the Internet at large. For this reason,
newer browser extension frameworks such as Chromium’s have integrated least privi-
lege separation via isolated worlds and a fine-grained permissions system to restrict the
capabilities of third-party extensions [7].
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However, extension security frameworks are not a panacea. In practice, their effec-
tiveness is degraded by over-privilege and a lack of understanding of the threats posed
by highly-privileged extensions on the part of users [18]. Indeed, despite the existence
of extension security frameworks, it has recently been shown that extension-based ad-
vertisement injection has become a popular and lucrative technique for dishonest parties
to monetize user web browsing. These extensions simply inject or replace ads in web
pages when users visit a website, thus creating or diverting an existing revenue stream
to the third party. Users often are not aware of these incidents and, even if this behavior
is noticed, it can be difficult to identify the responsible party.
While ad injection cannot necessarily be categorized as an outright malicious activ-
ity on its own, it is highly likely that many users in fact do not want or expect browser
extensions to inject advertisements or other content into Web pages. Moreover, it can
have a significant impact on the security and privacy of both users as well as web-
site publishers. For example, recent studies have shown that ad-injecting extensions not
only serve ads from ad networks other than the ones with which the website publishers
intended, but they also attempt to trick users into installing malware by inserting rogue
elements into the web page [46,48].
To address this problem, several automatic approaches have been proposed to de-
tect malicious behaviors (e.g., ad injection) in browser extensions [48,28,26]. In addi-
tion, centralized distribution points such as Chrome Web Store and Mozilla Add-ons
are using semi-automated techniques for review of extension behavior to detect mis-
behaving extensions. However, there is no guarantee that analyzing the extensions for
a limited period of time leads to revealing the ad injection behaviors. Finally, a client-
side detection methodology has been proposed in [46] that reports any deviation from
a legitimate DOM structure as potential ad injections. However, this approach requires
a priori knowledge of a legitimate DOM structure as well as cooperation from content
publishers.
Although ad injection can therefore potentially pose significant risks, this issue is
not as clear-cut as it might first seem. Some users might legitimately want the third-
party content injected by the extensions they install, even including injected advertise-
ments. This creates a fundamental dilemma for automated techniques that aim to iden-
tify clearly malicious or unwanted content injection, since such techniques cannot intuit
user intent and desires in a fully automatic way.
To resolve this dilemma, we present ORIGINTRACER, an in-browser approach to
highlight extension-based content modification of web pages. ORIGINTRACER mon-
itors the execution of browser extensions to detect content modifications such as the
injection of advertisements. Content modifications are visually highlighted in the con-
text of the web page in order to i) notify users of the presence of modified content,
and ii) inform users of the source of the modifications. With this information, users can
then make an informed decision as to whether they actually want these content modifi-
cations from specific extensions, or whether they would rather uninstall the extensions
that violate their expectations.
ORIGINTRACER assists users in detecting content injection by distinguishing in-
jected or modified DOM elements from genuine page elements. This is performed by
annotating web page DOM elements with a provenance label set that indicates the prin-
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cipal(s) responsible for adding or modifying that element, both while the page is load-
ing from the publisher as well as during normal script and extension execution. These
annotations serve as trustworthy, fine-grained provenance indicators for web page con-
tent. ORIGINTRACER can be easily integrated into any browser in order to inform users
of extension-based content modification. Since, ORIGINTRACER identifies all types of
content injections, it is able to highlight all injected advertisements regardless of their
types (e.g., flash ads, banner ads, and text ads).
We implemented a prototype of ORIGINTRACER as a set of modifications to the
Chromium browser, and evaluated its effectiveness by conducting a user study. The user
study reveals that ORIGINTRACER produced a significantly greater awareness of third-
party content modification, and did not detract from the users’ browsing experience.
Our results also suggests that ORIGINTRACER can be used as a complementary system
to ad blocking systems such as Adblock Plus [2] and Ghostery [4].
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are:
– We introduce a novel in-browser approach to provenance tracking for web content
at the granularity of DOM elements, and present a semantics for provenance propa-
gation due to script and extension execution. The approach leverages a high-fidelity
in-browser vantage point that allows it to construct a precise provenance label set
for each DOM element introduced into a web page.
– We implement a prototype called ORIGINTRACER that uses content provenance to
identify and highlight third-party content injection – e.g., unwanted advertisements
– by extensions to notify users of their presence and the originating principal.
– We evaluate the effectiveness, usability, and performance of our prototype, and
show that it is able to significantly assist users in identifying ad injection by exten-
sions in the wild without degrading browser performance or the user experience.
2 Background & Motivation
In the following, we introduce background information on browser extensions, present
an overview of advertisement injection as a canonical example of questionable content
modification, and motivate our approach in this context.
2.1 Browser Extensions
Browser extensions are programs that extend the functionality of a web browser. To-
day, extensions are typically implemented using a combination of HTML, CSS, and
JavaScript written against a browser-specific extension API. These APIs expose the
ability to modify the browser user interface in controlled ways, manipulate HTTP head-
ers, and modify web page content through the document object model (DOM) API. An
extension ecosystem is provided by almost all major browser vendors; for instance,
Google and Mozilla both host centralized repositories of extensions that users can
download at the Chrome Web Store and Mozilla Add-ons sites, respectively.
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Fig. 1: Overview of advertisement injection. (1) The user accesses the publisher’s site.
(2) An ad-injecting browser extension adds DOM elements to display ads to the user,
and optionally removes existing ads. (3) Ad revenue is diverted from the publisher.
(4) Ad impressions, clicks, and conversions are instead directed to the extension’s ad
network. (5) Ad revenue flows to the extension author.
2.2 Advertisement Injection
As web advertising grew in popularity, those in a position to modify web content such as
ISPs and browser extension authors realized that profit could be realized by injecting or
replacing ads in web pages. For instance, some ISPs began to tamper with HTTP traffic
in transit, injecting DOM elements into HTML documents that added ISP’s advertise-
ments into pages visited by their customers [10,30]. In a similar fashion, browser ex-
tensions started modifying pages to inject DOM elements in order to show ads to users
without necessarily obtaining the user’s prior consent. Ad injection has evolved to be-
come a common form of unrequested third-party content injection on today’s web [37].
These practices have several effects on both publishers and users. On one hand, ad
injection diverts revenue from the publisher to the third party responsible for the ad
injection. If advertisements are the primary source of income for a publisher, this can
have a significant effect on their bottom line. If the injected ads contain or reference un-
desired content (e.g., adult or political topics), ad injection can also harm the reputation
of the publisher from the user’s perspective. If the content injection is also malicious in
nature, the publisher’s reputation can be further harmed in addition to exposing users
to security risks due to malware, phishing, and other threats. Prior work has shown that
users exposed to ad injection are more likely to be exposed to “malvertising” and tradi-
tional malware [46,48]. Figure 1 gives an overview of ad injection’s effect on the normal
ad delivery process, while Figure 3 shows an instance of ad injection on amazon.com.
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Extension No. of Users Injected Element
Adblock Plus 10,000,000+ <iframe>
Google Translate 6,000,000+ <div>
Tampermonkey 5,800,000+ <img>
Evernote Web Clipper 4,300,000+ <iframe>
Google Dictionary 3,000,000+ <div>
Table 1: Five popular Chrome extensions that modify web pages as part of their benign
functionality.
2.3 Motivation
Recently, there have been efforts by browser vendors to remove ad-injecting exten-
sions from their repositories [1]. Although semi-automated central approaches have
been successful in identifying ad-injecting extensions, deceptive extensions can simply
hide their ad injection behaviors during the short period of analysis time. In addition,
finding web pages that trigger ad injection is a non-trivial task, and they can miss some
ad-injecting extensions. Moreover, there are extensions that are not provided through
the web stores, and users can get them from local marketplaces, which may not exam-
ined the extensions properly. Hence, we believe that there is a need for a protection
tool to combat ad injection on the client side in addition to centralized examination by
browser vendors.
Furthermore, automatically determining whether third-party content modification –
such as that due to ad injection – should be allowed is not straightforward. Benign exten-
sions extensively modify web pages as part of their normal functionality. To substantiate
this, we examined five popular Chrome extensions as of the time of writing; these are
listed in Table 1. Each of these extensions are available for all major browsers, and all
modify web pages (e.g., inject elements) to implement their functionality. Therefore,
automated approaches based on this criterion run a high risk of false positives when
attempting to identify malicious or undesirable extensions.
Moreover, it is not enough to identify that advertisements, for instance, have been
injected by a third party. This is because some users might legitimately desire the con-
tent that is being added to web pages by the extensions they install. To wit, it is pri-
marily for this reason that a recent purge of extensions from the Chrome Web Store
did not encompass the entirety of the extensions that were identified as suspicious in
a previous study, as the third-party content modification could not be clearly consid-
ered as malicious [46]. Instead, we claim that users themselves are best positioned to
make the determination as to whether third-party content modification is desired or not.
An approach that proceeds from this observation would provide sufficient, easily com-
prehensible information to users in order to allow an informed choice as to whether
content is desirable or should be blocked. It should be noted that defending against
drive-by downloads and general malware is not the focus of this paper. Rather, the goal
is to highlight injected ads to increase likelihood that user will make an informed choice
to not click on them.
We envision that ORIGINTRACER could be used as a complementary approach to
existing techniques such as central approaches used by browser vendors. Also, browser
vendors can benefit from using our system in addition to end users to detect the con-
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tent modifications by extensions in a more precise and reliable way. In the following
sections, we present design and implementation of our system.
3 Web Content Provenance
In this section, we describe an in-browser approach for identifying third-party content
modifications in web browsers. The approach adds fine-grained provenance tracking
to the browser, at the level of individual DOM elements. Provenance information is
used in two ways: i) to distinguish between content that originates from the web page
publisher and content injected by an unassociated third party, and ii) to indicate which
third party (e.g., extension) is responsible for content modifications using provenance
indicators. By integrating the approach directly into the browser, we guarantee the trust-
worthiness of both the provenance information and the visual indicators. That is, as the
browser is already part of the trusted computing base (TCB) in the web security model,
we leverage this as the appropriate layer to compute precise, fine-grained provenance
information. Similarly, the browser holds sufficient information to ensure that prove-
nance indicators cannot be tampered with or occluded by malicious extensions. While
we consider malicious or exploited browser plug-ins such as Flash Player outside our
threat model, we note that modern browsers take great pains to isolate plug-ins in least
privilege protection domains. We report separately on the implementation of the ap-
proach in Section 4.
In the following, we present our approach to tracking and propagating content
provenance, and then discuss provenance indicators and remediation strategies.
3.1 Content Provenance
Web pages are composed of HTML that references resources such as stylesheets, scripts,
images, plug-ins such as Flash objects, or even other web pages loaded inside frames.
The document object model (DOM) is a natural structural representation of a web
page that can be manipulated through a standard API, and serves as a suitable basis
for provenance tracking. In particular, our system tracks the provenance of each ele-
ment e contained in a DOM. Provenance for a DOM element is recorded as a set of
labels ` ∈ P (L), where the set of all labels L corresponds to a generalization of stan-
dard web origins to include extensions. That is, instead of the classic origin 3-tuple of
〈scheme,host,port〉, we record
L = 〈S, I, P,X〉
S = {scheme} ∪ {“extension”}
I = {host} ∪ {extension-identifier}
P = {port} ∪ {null}
X = {0, 1, 2, . . .}
In other words, a label is a 4-tuple that consists of a normal network scheme or exten-
sion, a network host or a unique extension identifier, a port or the special null value,
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Fig. 2: Element-granularity provenance tracking. (1) Content loaded directly from the
publisher is labeled with the publisher’s origin, l0. (2) An external script reference to
origin l1 is performed. (3) DOM modifications from l1’s script are labeled with the label
set {l0, l1}. (4) Further external script loads and subsequent DOM modifications induce
updated label sets – e.g., {l0, l1, l2}. (5) A DOM modification that originates from an
extension produces provenance label sets {l0, l1, l2, l3} for the element.
and an index used to impose a global total order on labels as described below. While
browsers use different extension identifiers, including randomly-generated identifiers,
the exact representation used is unimportant so long as there is a one-to-one mapping
between extensions and identifiers and their use is locally consistent within the browser.
An overview of provenance tracking is depicted in Figure 2.
Static Publisher Provenance. Content provenance tracking begins with a web page
load. As the DOM is parsed by the browser, each element is labeled with a singleton
label set containing the origin of the publisher, {l0}. Thus, static provenance tracking
is straightforward and equivalent to the standard use of origins as a browser security
context.
Dynamic Publisher Provenance. Content provenance becomes more interesting
in the presence of dynamic code execution. As JavaScript can add, modify, and remove
DOM elements in an arbitrary fashion using the DOM API exposed by the browser, it
is necessary to track these modifications in terms of provenance labels.
New provenance labels are created from the publisher’s label set {l0} as follows.
Whenever an external script is referenced from the initial DOM resulting from the page
load, a new label li, i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} is generated from the origin of the script. All sub-
sequent DOM modifications that occur as a result of an external script loaded from the
initial DOM are recorded as {l0, li}. Successive external script loads follow the ex-
pected inductive label generation process – i.e., three successive external script loads
from unique origins will result in a label set {l0, li, lj , lk}. Finally, label sets contain
unique elements such that consecutive external script loads from a previously accessed
origin are not reflected in the label for subsequent DOM modifications. For instance,
if the web page publisher loads a script from the publisher’s origin, then any resulting
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DOM modifications will have a provenance label set of {l0} instead of {l0, l0}. Con-
tent provenance is propagated for three generic classes of DOM operations: element
insertion, modification, and deletion.
Element insertions produce an updated DOM that contains the new element labeled
with the current label set, and potentially generates a new label set if the injected ele-
ment is a script. Element modifications produce a DOM where the modified element’s
label set is merged with the current label set. Finally, element deletions simply remove
the element from the DOM.
Extension Provenance. The third and final form of provenance tracking concerns
content modifications due to DOM manipulations by extensions. In this case, prove-
nance propagation follows the semantics for the above case of dynamic publisher prove-
nance. Where these two cases differ, however, is in the provenance label initialization.
While provenance label sets for content that originates, perhaps indirectly, from the web
page publisher contains the publisher’s origin label l0, content that originates from an
extension is rooted in a label set initialized with the extension’s label. In particular, con-
tent modifications that originate from an extension are not labeled by the publisher’s
origin. An exception to this occurs when the extension, either directly or indirectly,
subsequently loads scripts from the publisher, or modifies an existing element that orig-
inated from the publisher.
3.2 Content Provenance Indicators
With the fine-grained content provenance scheme described above, identifying the prin-
cipal responsible for DOM modifications is straightforward. For each element, all that
is required is to inspect its label set ` to check whether it contains the label of any
extension.
A related, but separate, question is how best to relay this information to the user.
In this design, several options are possible on a continuum from simply highlighting
injected content without specific provenance information to reporting the full ordered
provenance chain from the root to the most recent origin. The first option makes no
use of the provenance chain, while the other end of the spectrum is likely to overwhelm
most users with too much information, degrading the practical usefulness of provenance
tracking. We suspect that a reasonable balance between these two extremes is a summa-
rization of the full chain, for instance by reporting only the label of the corresponding
extension.
Finally, if a user decides that the third-party content modification is unwanted, an-
other design parameter is how to act upon this decision. Possible actions include block-
ing specific element modifications, removing the offending extension, or reporting its
behavior to a central authority. We report on the specific design choices we made with
respect to provenance indicators in the presentation of our implementation in Section 4.
4 OriginTracer
In this section, we present ORIGINTRACER, our prototype implementation for identify-
ing and highlighting extension-based web page content modifications. We implemented
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ORIGINTRACER as a set of modifications to the Chromium browser. In particular, we
modified both Blink and the extension engine to track the provenance of content in-
sertion, modification, and removal according to the semantics presented in Section 3.
These modifications also implement provenance indicators for suspicious content that
does not originate from the publisher. In total, our changes consist of approximately
900 SLOC for C++ and several lines of JavaScript1. In the following, we provide more
detail on the integration of ORIGINTRACER into Chromium.
4.1 Tracking Publisher Provenance
A core component of ORIGINTRACER is responsible for introducing and propagating
provenance label sets for DOM elements. In the following, we discuss the implementa-
tion of provenance tracking for publisher content.
Tracking Static Elements. As discussed in Section 3, provenance label sets for
static DOM elements that comprise the HTML document sent by the publisher as part
of the initial page load are equivalent to the publisher’s web origin – in our notation,
l0. Therefore, minimal modifications to the HTML parser were necessary to introduce
these element annotations, which is performed in an incremental fashion as the page is
parsed.
Tracking Dynamic Elements. To track dynamic content modifications, this com-
ponent of ORIGINTRACER must also monitor JavaScript execution. When a script
tag is encountered during parsing of a page, Blink creates a new element and attaches
it to the DOM. Then, Blink obtains the JavaScript code (fetching it from network in
the case of remote script reference), submits the script to the V8 JavaScript engine for
execution, and pauses the parsing process until the script execution is finished. During
execution of the script, some new elements might be created dynamically and inserted
into the DOM. According to the provenance semantics, these new elements inherit the
label set of the script. In order to create new elements in JavaScript, one can i) use DOM
APIs to create a new element and attach it to the web page’s DOM, or ii) write HTML
tags directly into the page.
In the first method, to create a new element object, a canonical example is to provide
the tag name to the createElement function. Then, other attributes of the newly
created element are set – e.g., after creating an element object for an a tag, an address
must be provided for its href attribute. Finally, the new element should be attached to
the DOM tree as a child using appendChild or insertBefore functions. In the
second method, HTML is inserted directly into the web page using the functions such
as write and writeln, or by modifying the innerHTML attribute. In cases where
existing elements are modified (e.g., changing an image’s src attribute), the element
inherits the label set of the currently executing script as well. In order to have a complete
mediation of all DOM modifications to Web page, Node class in Blink implementation
was instrumented in order to assign provenance label sets for newly created or modified
elements using the label set applied to the currently executing script.
Handling Events and Timers.An additional consideration for this ORIGINTRACER
component is modifications to event handlers and timer registrations, as developers
1 SLOC were measured using David Wheeler’s SLOCCount [5].
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make heavy use of event and timer callbacks in modern JavaScript. For instance, such
callbacks are used to handle user interface events such as clicking on elements, hovering
over elements, or to schedule code after a time interval has elapsed. In practice, this re-
quires the registration of callback handlers via addEventListener API for events,
and setTimeout and setInterval for timers. To mediate callbacks related to the
addition and firing of events and timers, we slightly modified the EventTarget and
DOMTimer classes in Blink, respectively. Specifically, we record the mapping between
the running scripts and their registered callback functions, and then recover the respon-
sible script for DOM modification during callback execution.
4.2 Tracking Extension Provenance
Chromium’s extension engine is responsible for loading extensions, checking their per-
missions against those declared in the manifest file, injecting content scripts, dispatch-
ing background scripts and content scripts to the V8 script engine for execution, and
providing a channel for communication between content scripts and background page.
Chromium extensions can manipulate the web page’s content by injecting content
scripts into the web page or using the webRequestAPI. Content scripts are JavaScript
programs that can manipulate the web page using the shared DOM, communicate with
external servers via XMLHttpRequest, invoke a limited set of chrome.* APIs,
and interact with their owning extension’s background pages. By using webRequest,
extensions are also able to modify and block HTTP requests and responses in order to
change the web page’s DOM.
In this work, we only track content modifications by content scripts and leave identi-
fying ad injection by webRequest for future engineering work. Prior work, however,
has mentioned that only 5% of ad injection incidents occurred via webRequest; in-
stead, Chrome extensions mostly rely on content scripts to inject advertisements [46].
Moreover, with modern websites becoming more complex, injecting stealthy advertise-
ment into the page using webRequest is not a trivial task.
Tracking Content Script Injection and Execution. To track elements created or
modified during the execution of content scripts, extension engine was modified to hook
events corresponding to script injection and execution. Content scripts can be inserted
into the web page using different methods. If a content script should be injected into
every matched web page, it must be registered in the extension manifest file using the
content scripts field. By providing different options for this field, one can con-
trol when and where the content scripts be injected. Another method is programmatic
injection, which is useful when content scripts should be injected in response to specific
events (e.g., a user clicks the extension’s browser action). With programmatic injection,
content scripts can be injected using the tabs.executeScript API if the tabs
permission is set in the manifest file. Either way, content scripts have a provenance
label set initialized with the extension’s label upon injection.
Handling Callback Functions. Chromium’s extension engine provides a messag-
ing API as a communication channel between background pages and content scripts.
Background pages and content scripts can receive messages from each other by pro-
viding a callback function for the onMessage or onRequest events, and can send
messages by invoking sendMessage or sendRequest. To track the registration
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Fig. 3: An example of indicator for an injected advertisement on amazon.com.
and execution of callback functions, the send request and event modules were
slightly modified in the extension engine. Specifically, we added some code to map
registered callbacks to their corresponding content scripts in order to find the extension
responsible for DOM modification.
4.3 Content Provenance Indicators
Given DOM provenance information, ORIGINTRACER must first i) identify when sus-
picious content modifications – e.g., extension-based ad injection – has occurred, and
additionally ii) communicate this information to the user in an easily comprehensible
manner. To implement the first requirement, our prototype monitors for content modifi-
cations where a subtree of elements are annotated with label sets that contains a partic-
ular extension’s label. This check can be performed efficiently by traversing the DOM
and inspecting element label sets after a set of changes have been performed on the
DOM.
There are several possible options to communicate content provenance as mentioned
in Section 3. In our current prototype, provenance is indicated using a configurable bor-
der color of the root element of the suspicious DOM subtree. This border should be
chosen to be visually distinct from the existing color palette of the web page. Finally, a
tooltip indicating the root label is displayed when the user hovers their mouse over the
DOM subtree. An example is shown in Figure 3. To implement these features, ORIG-
INTRACER modifies style and title attributes. In addition, since ORIGINTRACER
highlights elements in an online fashion, it must delay the addition of highlighting until
the element is attached to the page’s DOM and is displayed. Therefore, modifications
were made to the ContainerNode class that is responsible for attaching new ele-
ments to the DOM.
While we did not exhaustively explore the design space of content provenance in-
dicators in this work (e.g., selective blocking of extension-based DOM modifications),
we report on the usability of the prototype implementation in our evaluation.
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5 Evaluation
In this section, we measure the effectiveness, usability, and performance of content
provenance indicators using the ORIGINTRACER prototype. In particular, the questions
we aim to answer with this evaluation are:
(Q1) How susceptible are users to injected content such as third-party advertisements?
(§5.1)
(Q2) Do provenance indicators lead to a significant, measurable decrease in the likeli-
hood of clicking on third-party content that originates from extensions? (§5.1)
(Q3) Are users likely to use the system during their normal web browsing? (§5.2)
(Q4) Does integration of the provenance tracking system significantly degrade the
users’ browsing experience and performance of the browser on a representative
sample of websites? (§5.3)
Ethics Statement. As part of the evaluation, we performed two experiments in-
volving users unaffiliated with the project as described below. Due to the potential
risk to user confidentiality and privacy, we formulated an experimental protocol that
was approved by our university’s institutional review board (IRB). This protocol in-
cluded safeguards designed to prevent exposing sensitive user data such as account
names, passwords, personal addresses, and financial information, as well as to protect
the anonymity of the study participants with respect to data storage and reporting. While
users were not initially told the purpose of some of the experiments, all users were de-
briefed at the end of each trial as to the true purpose of the study.
5.1 Effectiveness of the Approach
Similar to prior work [13], we performed a user study to measure the effectiveness
of content provenance in enabling users to more easily identify unwanted third-party
content. However, we performed the user study with a significantly larger group of
participants. The study population was composed of 80 students that represent a range
of technical sophistication. We conducted an initial briefing prior to the experiments
where we made it clear that we were interested in honest answers.
User Susceptibility to Ad Injection. The goal of the first phase of the experiment
was to measure whether users were able to detect third-party content that was not in-
tended for inclusion by the publishers of web pages presented to them. Users were
divided into two equal sized groups of 40. In each group, users were first presented
with three unmodified Chromium browsers, each of which had a separate ad-injecting
extension installed: Auto Zoom, Alpha Finder, and X-Notifier for the first group, and
Candy Zapper, uTorrent, and Gethoneybadger for the second group. These exten-
sions were chosen because they exhibit a range of ad injection behaviors, from subtle
injections that blend into the publisher’s web page to very obvious pop-ups that are
visually distinct from the publisher’s content.
Using each browser, the participants were asked to visit three popular retail web-
sites: Amazon, Walmart, and Alibaba. Each ad-injecting extension monitors for visits
to these websites, and each injects three different types of advertisements into these
12
Auto Zoom Alpha Finder X-Notifier0
10
20
30
40
50
60
%
 o
f R
ep
or
te
d 
In
je
ct
ed
 A
ds
Amazon
Walmart
Alibaba
(a) Group 1.
Candy Zapper uTorrent Gethoneybadger0
10
20
30
40
50
60
%
 o
f R
ep
or
te
d 
In
je
ct
ed
 A
ds
Amazon
Walmart
Alibaba
(b) Group 2.
Fig. 4: Percentage of injected ads that are reported correctly by all the participants.
sites. For each website, we asked the participants to examine the page and tell us if they
noticed any content in the page that did not belong to the website – in other words,
whether any content did not seem to originate from the publisher. For each group, we
aggregated the responses and presented the percentage of correctly reported ad injection
incidents for each extension in Figure 4.
The results demonstrate that a significant number of Internet users often do not rec-
ognize when ad injection occurs in the wild, even when told to look for foreign content.
For example, 34 participants did not recognize any injected ads out of the three that
were added to Amazon website by Auto Zoom extension. Comparatively more users
were able to identify ads injected by Alpha Finder and X-Notifier. We suspect the rea-
son for this is because these extensions make use of pop-up advertisements that are
easier to recognize as out-of-place. However, a significant number of users neverthe-
less failed to note these pop-up ads, and even after prompting stated that they thought
these ads were part of the publisher’s content. More generally, across all websites and
extensions, many participants failed to identify any injected ads whatsoever.
We then asked each participant whether they would click on ads in general to mea-
sure the degree of trust that users put into the contents on the publisher’s page. Specifi-
cally, we asked participants to rate the likelihood of clicking on ads on a scale from one
to five, where one means that they would never click on an ad while five means that they
would definitely click on an ad. We aggregated the responses and present the results in
Figure 5a.
These results show that a significant number of users, roughly half, would click
on advertisements that might not originate from the publisher, but that were instead
injected by an extension. This demonstrates the effectiveness of ad injection as a mech-
anism for diverting revenue from publishers to extension authors. It also shows the
potential effectiveness of malicious extensions in using content modifications to expose
users to traditional malware.
Effectiveness of Content Provenance Indicators. After the first phase of the ex-
periment, we briefly explained the purpose of ORIGINTRACER and content provenance
to the participants. Then, for each participant in each group, we picked one of the three
ad-injecting extensions in which, the participant did not detect most of the injected ads
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Fig. 5: User study results. For each boxplot, the box represents the boundaries of the
first and third quartiles. The band within each box is the median, while the black square
is the mean. The whiskers represent 1.5 IQR boundaries, and outliers are represented as
a + symbol.
and installed it on a Chromium instance equipped with ORIGINTRACER. Then, each
participant was asked to visit one of the three retail websites by his choice and iden-
tify third-party content modifications – i.e., injected ads – with the help of provenance
indicators. The results are shown in Figure 5b, where unassisted identification is the
aggregated number of reported ad injections without any assistance in the presence of
three ad-injecting extensions across three retail websites, and assisted identification is
the number of reported injected ads with the help of content provenance indicators.
Results are normalized to [0, 1].
These results clearly imply that users are more likely to recognize the presence
of third-party content modifications using provenance indicators. To confirm statistical
significance, we performed a hypothesis test where the null hypothesis is that prove-
nance indicators do not assist in identifying third-party content modifications, while the
alternative hypothesis is that provenance indicators do assist in identifying such con-
tent. Using a paired t-test, we obtain a p-value of 4.9199× 10−7, sufficient to reject the
null hypothesis at a 1% significance level. The outliers in assisted identification are due
to the fact that our ad highlighting technique was not identifiable by a small number of
participants. We believe that using different visual highlighting techniques would make
it easier for users to identify the injected ads.
Finally, we asked each participant how likely they would be to use the content prove-
nance system in their daily web browsing. We asked participants to rate this likelihood
on a scale from one to five, where one means they would never use the system and
five means that they would always use it. The results are shown in Figure 5c, and indi-
cate that most users would be willing to use a content provenance system. The reason
behind the outliers is because a few of the participants stated that they do not need
our system since they would not click on any advertisements. However, we note that
it can be difficult to distinguish between advertisements and other legitimate content
(e.g., products in retail sites) and, consequently, users might be lured into clicking on
ad content injected by extensions.
Summary. From this user study, we draw several conclusions. First, we confirm that
in many cases users are unable to distinguish injected third-party content from publisher
content. We also show that because users place trust in publishers, they will often click
on injected ads, and thus they tend to be susceptible to ad injection. Our data shows
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that content provenance assists in helping users distinguish between trusted publisher
content and injected third-party content that should not be trusted. Finally, we show that
many users would be willing to use the system based on their experience in this study.
5.2 Usability
We conducted another experiment on a separate population of users to measure the
usability of the ORIGINTRACER prototype. The user population was composed of 13
students with different technical background. We presented the participants with ORIG-
INTRACER integrated into Chromium 43, and asked them to browse the web for several
hours, visiting any websites of their choice. For privacy reasons, however, we asked
users to avoid browsing websites that require a login or that involve sensitive subject
matter (e.g., adult or financial websites). In addition, for each user, we randomly se-
lected 50 websites from the Alexa Top 500 that satisfy our user privacy constraints and
asked the user to visit them. In particular, each participant was asked to browse at least
three levels down from the home page and visit external links contained in each site. Fi-
nally, to gain some assurance that ORIGINTRACER would not break benign extensions,
we configured the browser with the five high-profile extensions list in Table 1.
During the browsing session, the browser was modified to record the number of
URLs visited. We also asked participants to record the number of pages in which they
encountered one of two types of errors. Type I errors are those where the browser
crashed, system error messages were displayed, pages would not load, or the website
was completely unusable for some other reason. Type II errors include non-catastrophic
errors that impact usability but did not preclude it – e.g., the page took an abnormally
long time to load, or the appearance of the page was not as expected. We also asked
users to report any broken functionality for the benign extensions described above as
well.
Out of close to 2,000 URLs, two catastrophic errors and 27 non-catastrophic er-
rors were encountered. However, we note that the majority of URLs rendered and exe-
cuted correctly. In addition, none of the participants reported any broken extensions. We
therefore conclude that the proposed approach is compatible with modern browsers and
benign extensions, and further work would very likely allow the prototype to execute
completely free of errors.
5.3 Performance
To measure the performance overhead of ORIGINTRACER, we configured both an un-
modified Chromium browser and the prototype to automatically visit the Alexa Top 1K.
The Alexa Top 1K covers many popular websites and is weighted towards being repre-
sentative of the sites that people use most often. By using this test set, we ensured that
each browser visited a broad spectrum of websites that include both static and dynamic
content, and especially websites that make heavy use of third-party components and
advertisements. Moreover, we configured both browser instances with the five benign
extensions discussed in Section 2 that change the DOM to measure performance in the
presence of extensions. A more detailed evaluation would analyze more pages on these
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websites to garner a more realistic representation, but that is beyond the scope of the
current work.
We built a crawler based on Selenium WebDriver [44] to automatically visit the
entire list of websites and recorded the total elapsed time from the beginning of the
browsing process until the entire list of websites was visited. Specifically, our crawler
moves to the next website in the list when the current website is fully loaded, signified
by the firing of the onload event. In order to account for fluctuations in browsing
time due to network delays and the dynamic nature of advertisements, we repeated
the experiment 10 times and measured the average elapsed time. The average elapsed
time for browsing the home pages of the Alexa Top 1K websites measured in this way
is 3,457 seconds for the unmodified browser and 3,821 seconds for ORIGINTRACER.
Therefore, ORIGINTRACER incurred a 10.5% overhead on browsing time on average.
We also measured the delay imposed by ORIGINTRACER on startup time by launching
the browser 10 times and measuring the average launch time. ORIGINTRACER did not
cause any measurable overhead on startup time.
While this overhead is not insignificant, we note that our user study in Section 5.2
indicates that many users would be willing to trade off actual perceived performance
overhead against the security benefits provided by the system. Moreover, this proto-
type is just a proof-of-concept implementation of our system and there is still room for
optimizing the implementation to decrease the page load time.
6 Related Work
6.1 Malicious Advertising
Substantial research on malicious advertisements has focused on isolation and contain-
ment [3,15,34]. Other approaches have focused on detecting drive-by downloads by
employing the properties of HTTP redirections to identify malicious behavior [38,45].
Dynamic analyses have also been used to detect drive-by downloads and web-hosted
malware [11,12,36]. Li et al. [31] investigated the advertisement delivery process to de-
tect malvertising by automatically generating detection rules. Web tripwires [43] were
proposed to detect in-flight page changes performed by ISPs to inject advertisements.
6.2 Browser Extension Security
Browser extension security has recently become a hot topic. The Chromium extension
framework substantially improved the ability of users to limit the amount of privilege
conferred upon potentially vulnerable extensions [7], and follow-on work has studied
the success of this approach [18,33]. Other work has broadly studied malicious ex-
tensions that attempt to exfiltrate sensitive user data [32,35]. For instance, Arjun et
al. showed that many extensions in the Chrome Web Store are over-privileged for the
actual services they purport to provide [21].
A recent line of work has focused on the problem of ad injection via browser exten-
sions. Thomas et al. [46] proposed a detection methodology in which, they used a priori
knowledge of a legitimate DOM structure to report the deviations from that structure
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as potential ad injections. However, this approach is not purely client-side and requires
cooperation from content publishers. Expector [48] inspects a browser extension and
determines if it injects advertisements into websites. Hulk [28] is a dynamic analy-
sis system that automatically detects Chrome extensions that perform certain types of
malicious behaviors, including ad injection. WebEval [26] is an automatic system that
considers an extension’s behaviors, code, and author reputation to identify malicious
extensions distributed through the Chrome Web Store.
In contrast, our work does not attempt to automatically classify extensions that en-
gage in content modification as malicious or not, but rather focuses on enabling users to
make informed decisions as to whether extensions engage in desirable behavior or not.
6.3 Provenance Tracking
A significant amount of work has examined the use of provenance in various contexts.
For instance, one line of work has studied the collection of provenance information
for generic applications up to entire systems [19,24,42]. However, to our knowledge,
no system considers the provenance of fine-grained web content comprising the DOM.
Provenance tracking is also related to information flow control (IFC), for which a con-
siderable body of work exists at the operating system level [16,29,49], the language
level [40,9], as well as the web [20,25]. In contrast to our work, IFC is focused more on
enforcing principled security guarantees for new applications rather than tracking and
indicating data provenance for existing ones.
Numerous systems have examined the use of dynamic taint analysis, a related con-
cept to provenance. Some prior work [8,17] focuses on tracking information flow within
the browser, Sabre [14] detects whether extensions access sensitive information within
the browser, and DSI enforcement [41] defends against XSS attacks by preserving the
integrity of document structure in the browser. While there is certainly an overlap be-
tween dynamic taint analysis and provenance, taint analysis is most often focused on
simple reachability between sources and sinks, while provenance is concerned with
precisely tracking principals that influenced data.
Finally, there is a line of work that examines provenance on the web. Some prior
work [22,23,39] concerns coarse-grained ontologies for describing the origins of data
on the web, and does not consider provenance at a fine-grained scale within the browser.
ESCUDO [27] only considers the principals that can be controlled by web applications,
and it does not handle plug-ins and browser extensions. LeakTracker [47] performs
principal-based tracking on web pages to study privacy violations related to JavaScript
libraries, but it only tracks injection of scripts into the page, and does not provide any
provenance information for other types of DOM elements. Excision [6] is the closest
work to ours, which tracks inclusions of different resources in web pages and blocks in-
clusion of malicious resources by analyzing inclusion sequences on the page. Although
the techniques are similar, they are used for different purposes. Excision discards the
injection of DOM elements that do not reference remote content (e.g., div), and aside
from source attributes, that does not track modifications to DOM elements. However,
ORIGINTRACER identifies all types of DOM modification in the page, and instead of
blocking content originating from extensions, it highlights them in the context of the
web page.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced fine-grained web content provenance tracking and demon-
strated its use for identifying unwanted third-party content such as injected advertise-
ments. We evaluated a prototype implementation, a modified version of Chromium we
call ORIGINTRACER, through a user study that demonstrated a statistically significant
improvement in the ability of users to identify unwanted third-party content. Our per-
formance evaluation shows a modest overhead on a large representative sample of pop-
ular websites, while our user experiments indicate that users are willing to trade off a
slight decrease in performance for more insight into the sources of web content that
they browse. We also performed a comprehensive study on the content modifications
performed by ad-injecting extensions in the wild.
In future work, we plan to explore other uses of provenance on the web. Due to the
highly interconnected structure of the web and the oftentimes obscure nature of its trust
relationships, we believe that surfacing this information in the form of provenance is a
generally useful capability, and can be applied in other novel ways in order to lead to
safer and more informed web browsing. Finally, we plan to open source our prototype
implementation in the hopes that it will be useful to the wider research community.
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